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 A B S T R A C T  
 Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how organisational closure can inform 
strategic foresight.  
Design/methodology/approach – We draw insights from illustrative cases, i.e. Swissair, 
Sabena and Cameroon Airlines to illustrate our theoretical analysis.  
Findings – The study shed light on the effects of internal and external factors in 
precipitating business closures. We established that top executives’ hubris, resistance to 
change and over-reliance on external consultants are some of precursors to organisational 
closure.  
Research limitations/implications – Our analysis provides a range of strategies that 
organisations can pursue to learn from other firms’ closure and improve their survivability 
and chances of future success.  
Originality/value – In spite of a growing body of literature on strategic foresight and 
organisational closure, the literature has largely developed in isolation and as such our 
understanding of the relationship between strategic foresight and organisational closure as 
remained severely limited. The paper integrates these two streams of research to enrich 
our understanding of how firms can learn from others to improve their strategic foresight.  
Introduction  
Over the past half century, organisational theorists, strategist and business historians have 
offered various explanations as to why some companies fail whilst others thrive in the same 
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1965). This stream of scholarly 
work has often been accompanied by the identification of factors such as liabilities of 
smallness and newness as primary causes of business failure/closure (Hager, Galaskiewicz, 
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Bielefeld and Pins, 1996; Singh, House and Tucker, 1986a). At the same time, scholars of 
strategic foresight have offered various reasons why organisations are often blindsided by 
changes in their businesses which ultimately bring about their decline and exit (see Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1994).  
Despite clear linkages between these two streams of research and the potential to further 
enrich our understanding, to date, however, most research has largely developed in isolation. 
Although the causes of business failure/closure continue to be an active area of scholarly 
discourse (Walsh and Bartunek, 2011), our understanding of the causes and how they can 
inform strategic foresight of outside firms warrants further scholarly attention. Our purpose in 
this study is to examine why companies fail and how failure can inform strategic foresight of 
other firms. We contend that learning from others’ failure can improve the “foresightfulness” 
of an organisation. In developing our arguments on this largely overlooked issue, we turn to 
the illustrative cases of failed companies, i.e. Swissair, Sabena and Cameroon Airlines to 
shed light on the subject. Although these firms operated largely in different regions of the 
world, factors precipitating their demise have the potential to enhance our understanding of 
business closure and strategic foresight.  
Our article makes two main contributions to the literature. First, although scholars have 
examined both business failure and strategic foresight, they have failed to articulate the 
mechanisms through which business failure can inform strategic foresight. We build on and 
extend the existing literature by developing a unified mechanism for understanding both 
subjects. Second, our study utilised insights from failed cases to articulate how organisational 
demise can inform strategic foresight, an issue that has been largely overlooked by scholars.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on organisational 
closure and strategic foresight towards developing an integrated framework. Second, we set 
out the research design and data sources. We then illustrate our theoretical analysis using the 
illustrative cases. We conclude by setting out implications for theory and practice.  
Organisational closure and strategic foresight: an integrative review 
The organisational closure can be defined as a situation where firms “cease operations, lose 
their legal identity or lose their capacity to govern themselves” (Hager et al., 2004, p. 160). 
Organisational closure literature presents two conflicting views on the cause of closure: the 
deterministic and voluntaristic perspectives (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). According to the 
first view, the deterministic perspective attributes business closure to factors outside the 
boundary of the firm. These environmental factors include changes in regulations, 
technological change, government interference, competition and economic decline, over 
which management has limited control (Tirole, 1988; Hager et al., 1996). On the other hand, 
the voluntaristic school suggests that business closure is attributed to factors “arising from 
within” the boundary of the firm such as leadership and managerial issues (Amankwah-
Amoah et al., 2013). Some studies have identified factors such as mismanagement, loss of 
key personnel and weak financial position as causes of business closure (Singh et al., 1986b; 
Hager et al., 2004).  
Related to the above is another stream of research anchored in the upper echelons’ 
perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) which argues that top executives of companies play 
an influential role in resource deployment and decision making, and therefore can alter or 
accelerate the fortune of a company. A number of scholars have suggested that a firm’s 
survival often depends on its ability to match the firm’s routines, structure and processes to 
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changes in the environment such as culture and technological developments (Drazin and Van 
de Ven, 1985). Others have suggested that star executives provide firms with access to scarce 
resources and expertise which help to prolong their lifespan (Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser and 
Lee, 2008; Sutton and Callahan, 1987).  
However, one of the more influential lines of thought suggests that top executives’ departure 
from financially weak firms leads to diminished legitimacy and accelerates the firm’s exit 
from an industry (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). A large stream of literature indicates that 
young firms are more likely to fail than older firms, largely due to the liabilities of newness 
and smallness (Hager et al., 2004). This is largely because younger firms tend to have limited 
experiences, fewer slack resources and less legitimacy to be utilised to attract new customers 
and investors (Hager et al., 1996).  
Although business closure may stem from factors such as lack of skilled personnel to foresee 
strategic implementation, mismanagement, inefficient systems, faulty routines and process, 
and poor attitude to work (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014), organisations with a greater degree of 
foresight can anticipate and respond to the early warning signals and thereby are able to 
mitigate eventual failure (Costanzo and MacKay, 2008).  
Strategic foresight can be defined as the “process of developing a range of views of possible 
ways in which the future could develop, and understanding these sufficiently well to be able 
to decide what decisions can be taken today to create the best possible tomorrow’’ (Horton, 
1999, p. 5). It entails the ability to scan the environment to identify, interpret and respond to 
looming challenges and opportunities so as to create a sustainable organisation (Sarpong and 
Maclean, 2014). By engaging in environmental scanning activities, organisations would be 
better positioned to chart the future course of action (Vecchiato, 2012).  
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A plethora of scholarly works have suggested that strategic foresight is essential for long-
term organisational survival (Slaughter, 1996; Vecchiato, 2012). Managers with a degree of 
foresight and peripheral vision can not only anticipate changes on the horizon, but also devise 
a range of strategies geared towards learning from others’ failures (Ahuja, Coff and Lee, 
2005; Sarpong, Maclean and Davis, 2013). Indeed, there is a growing stream of research 
which suggests that business failure provides an opportunity for other companies to learn 
from their experiences and devise strategies to help them avoid befalling the same fate 
(Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007).  
The above line of reasoning implies that strategic foresight partly depends of other firms’ 
ability to identify the causes of others’ failure and learn from it (summarised in Figure 1). 
Our framework also indicates that firms’ responses to failure include systemic responses 
which refer to structural, process and cultural changes, whereas the strategic responses relate 
to factors such as vision and values of the firms. Although it has been suggested that 
organisations should learn from others’ demise to improve their chances of success 
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2011), our understanding of the mechanisms through which 
organisations achieve such alignment remains unclear. This study seeks to fill this theoretical 
gap using the case of collapsed companies.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Research design and data sources 
Our study focuses on three companies from the global airline industry, i.e. Swissair, Sabena 
and Cameroon Airlines. We adopted the multiple case study approach to help provide a 
“more compelling and more robust” analysis as well as cross-case comparisons (Yin, 2009, p. 
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53; Leonard-Barton, 1990). This approach is expected to lead to the identification of unique 
processes, patterns and key themes inherent in the demise of the companies (see Leonard-
Barton, 1990). Scholars have demonstrated that gaining access to former top executives to 
discuss business failure and factors that precipitated it remains “one of the most challenging 
barriers researchers face” (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003, p. 3718).  
Given the lifespan of the companies extends over several decades and the fact that they 
collapsed years ago, we rely heavily on archival records to provide insights into the 
organisations. Archival records can be defined as “documents made or received and 
accumulated by a person or organisation in the course of the conduct of affairs and preserved 
because of their continuing value” (Ellis, 1993, p. 2). Indeed, archival records are 
“particularly suited to generating developmental explanations, in other words, explaining 
processes of change and evolution” (Welch, 2000, p. 198) as this study seeks to accomplish. 
The archival records included government reports, newspaper reports, trade magazines, 
company records, public speeches by government officials and policy papers. Indeed, 
archival sources generally are more detailed and less obtrusive, and have the potential to 
develop a novel theory (Welch, 2000). We also sought historical air traffic and passenger data 
on the airlines from government agencies and departments. We employ the cases to help 
identify the causes of the companies’ failure and sources of learning from the failures. 
Case analysis 
In the following sections, we tease out the background information of the case firms and 
discuss factors that led to their demises.  
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Case 1: SwissAir, 1931–2002: a brief history 
SwissAir was once Switzerland's national airline, founded in 1931 but after decades of 
operations it eventually closed down in 2002. For over seven decades, the airline was 
regarded as the symbol of national reliability, dependability, precision, punctuality, quality 
service, efficiency and financial probity (Gow, 2007; The Economist, 2001). These qualities 
were largely regarded as embodying the “very essence of Swiss-ness” (Buerkle and 
Anderson, 2002). The airline was viewed with national pride and attracted accolades such as 
“the ultimate icon” and a “beacon of Swiss efficiency” (Bonsu, 2001). In October 2001, the 
airline was on the verge of collapse with debts of around 17 billion Swiss francs ($13.6 
billion) (Clark and Harnischfeger, 2007). The demise of the airline was a blow to the long-
held reputation for efficiency. The eventual closure in 2002 can be traced to a number of 
factors. We first examine the internal factors. 
The "Hunter strategy" 
From the mid-1940s through to the 1980s, the airline pursued a strategy that was risk-averse 
with the top management team reluctant to engage in risky and life-threatening ventures 
(Knorr and Arndt, 2003). For decades, this strategy helped the firm to preserve its operations 
and ensure long-term survival. The financial stability earned it the name “the Flying Bank”. 
In 1997, Philippe Bruggisser was appointed CEO and replaced the long-time CEO Otto 
Loepfe. Mr. Bruggisser was known to the organisation, having managed the group’s catering 
and retail operations. The change at the top was accompanied by a change in strategy. In the 
late 1990s, the board of the company decided to pursue a more aggressive borrowing and 
acquisition policy referred to as the “Hunter strategy” (Steger and Krapf, 2002). At the core 
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of the strategy was an attempt to diversify its portfolio of activities by expanding across 
Europe. The strategy entailed acquiring stakes in multiple airlines (Gow, 2007).  
Stated differently, the strategy sought to achieve growth through acquisition rather than 
internal development. The rejection of organic growth meant that more resources and new 
expertise were required to acquire and manage stakes in multiple airlines. By the mid-1990s, 
the airline started acquiring stakes in financially weak airlines across Europe; however, the 
depleting of its financial resources by this strategy was never fully acknowledged (Bonsu, 
2001). By mid-2000, the airline had a 49.5% stake in Sabena; 70% in Crossair; 49% in both 
Air Littoral and AOM, and 10% stake in LOT among its portfolio (Doganis, 2006). By late 
2001, the high investments, in tandem with the heavy losses, had altered the fortune and 
destroyed both Swissair and its Qualiflyer alliance (ILO, 2001). In all, the airline spent over 
$1 billion to acquire stakes in many floundering airlines with deep-seated cultural 
impediments to change and inability to compete (The Economist, 2001).  
Although the Swissair board which made the disastrous investments in Poland's LOT and 
Belgium's Sabena Airways was subsequently fired (Bonsu, 2001), the effects on the firm’s 
finances and operations became difficult to erase. In 1996, Swissair wrote off its equity stake 
in Sabena which contributed a loss to the business (The Economist, 2001). The aggressive 
expansion strategy diluted and disrupted its attempts to safeguard the historical heritage, 
maintain control and contain costs. The airline was considered “neither big enough to be 
market leaders, nor small enough to fit into a niche” (The Economist, 2001, p. 54).  
Prior to the late 1990s, the airline was regarded as “one of the most admired airlines in the 
world, famous for punctuality and superior in-flight service” (The Economist, 2001, p. 53–
54). However, by 2000, the airline recorded a loss of 2.9 billion francs ($1.8bn) for the first 
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time in its 70-year history and in so doing, absorbed most of its entire capital reserves 
(Richter, 2001). By early 2001, the airline was struggling to avoid bankruptcy with losses of 
around $1.7 billion and debts of more than six times the value of its equity (Clark and 
Harnischfeger, 2007). Although inter-firm co-operation can improve firms’ survival and 
success, in the case of Swissair the acquisitions actually weakened its financial position and 
accelerated the process of decline to a point of no return. 
Executives’ hubris and risk taking 
Another factor which contributed to the demise was executive hubris. Hubris can be defined 
as the “exaggerated belief about one’s own judgment that may deviate from objective 
standards” (Li and Tang, 2010, p. 46). This is a situation where the assessment of the top 
executives and their predictions of synergies in the acquisitions far exceeded the real value of 
the target firms. The top executives’ exaggerated self-confidence led the firm astray. In the 
mid-1990s, the top executives of the airline consisted of eminences from finance and politics 
who “arrogantly believed that they could compete with giants like British Airways and 
Deutsche Lufthansa” (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002, p. 24). Indeed, the overconfident 
executives overestimated their own abilities, expertise and problem-solving capabilities.  
The senior management executives of the international airline “were supremely confident of 
their ability to whip new airline partners into shape – after all, they were managing one of the 
world's most highly regarded carriers” (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002, p. 24; Bonsu, 2001). 
The top executives also appeared to hold limited information about the acquired airlines and 
their future prospects. This then led to misperception of the environment and value of 
potential partners leading to the paying of higher premiums for the floundering airlines. The 
quote below captures the issue: 
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“The Swissair saga highlights … the parochial instincts and hubris of its homegrown 
managers. Many Swiss believe that the reasons for Swissair's collapse lie in the very 
clannishness of their society – the tightly interwoven corporate and financial 
relationships and the shared political, social and military connections that define life 
in one of the world's most intimate financial centers.” (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002, 
p. 24) 
The firm became more detached from wider society as the elites took on more prominent 
roles. Arguably, the “Hunter strategy” can be partly traced to the arrogance within the firm 
and desperation to “punch above its weight on the international scene” even though it was a 
small airline at the start of the strategy (Bonsu, 2001). Given that Swissair paid higher 
acquisition premiums for all the airlines, it became increasingly difficult to integrate them 
into its operations to create value. The top executives’ overconfidence also led to an 
underestimation of the level of resources required to make the acquisitions work. Overall, the 
acquisitions eventually became value destroying and contributed to the demise of the airline 
and its partners.  
Overreliance on outsiders 
In order to garner support, legitimacy and symbolic recognition for the “Hunter strategy”, the 
firm emphasised the support and advocacy of outsider agency with the necessary expertise. 
The strategy was crafted, advocated and promoted by McKinsey consultants which helped to 
confer legitimacy and credibility (Byrne, Muller and Zellner, 2002). McKinsey was 
considered to possess the expert knowledge on the issue and therefore provide ammunition 
for management to promote the strategy.  
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Historically, McKinsey has been regarded as one of the world-leading strategy firms, 
possessing “the high priest of high-level consulting, with the most formidable intellectual 
firepower, the classiest client portfolio, and the greatest global reach of any adviser to 
management in the world” (Byrne et al., 2002 p. 66–76). In 1998, McKinsey and Co 
recommended to the firm the adoption of the strategy by acquiring stakes in several European 
partners (Doganis, 2006). Over the subsequent two years, the so-called alliance-based 
strategy, Qualiflyer alliance, led to acquisitions across Europe. In an attempt to build a force 
in European aviation alongside the three leading players at the time – Air France, British 
Airways and Lufthansa – the Swissair Group acquired minority stakes in multiple airlines 
which were largely unprofitable (ILO, 2001).  
The airline acquired stakes in European airlines including AOM, Air Littoral and Air Liberté 
in France, Sabena in Belgium, LTU in Germany and TAP in Portugal (The Economist, 2001). 
The weak financial position of these firms meant that at the outset, the financial position of 
Swissair was under strain (ILO, 2001). As a result, the firm ended its financial support to Air 
Littoral in 2001 and subsequently sold its stake. In the same year, AOM-Air Liberté also 
sought bankruptcy protection, signifying the looming and precarious position of the firm. For 
instance, the French airlines were operating in the shadows of Air France and had failed to 
overcome the threat from high-speed trains or deal with the need to reduce costs (The 
Economist, 2001). The acquisitions eventually cost the airline Sf3.7 billion ($2.3 billion) in 
operating losses and write-offs in 2000 alone (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002). 
The failure was unsurprising given that British Airways acquired a stake in Air Liberte in 
1997 as part of its failed attempt to enter the French market and then sold the stake to 
Swissair which was desperate to expand across Europe (Euronews, 2007). McKinsey and Co 
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was seen to have advocated a risky strategy which sowed the seeds of destruction and harmed 
Swissair’s long-term survival. However, it is worth noting that consultants have long claimed 
that they only provide innovative ideas, advice and strategy rather than responsibility for 
execution (The Economist, 2002). The relationship with McKinsey fostered trust and 
gathered confidence in the strategy. Indeed, McKinsey had historically protected and 
cultivated long-term client relationships which created conditions for the strategy to be 
adopted (Byrne et al., 2002). 
External environmental factors 
A number of external factors altered the firm’s fortune. Prominent among them was the 
aircraft accident in 1998 when flight SR111 crashed off Canada's Atlantic coast. The disaster 
led to the death of all 229 people aboard the flight from New York to Geneva (Brooke, 1999). 
The accident tarnished the established reputation of safety of the airline and started to affect 
its ability to attract customers (Gosling, 2013). Another contributory factor was the external 
constraints on the firm’s operation. Given that the population of Zurich was merely 350,000 
and Switzerland was also outside the European Union, Swissair did not enjoy the full benefit 
of Europe's open skies (Kay, 2007; ILO, 2001).  
In the early 1990s, Swissair had lobbied for a “Yes” vote knowing the benefits of being in the 
centre of the European market which included gaining access to the European aviation 
market as its larger rivals (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002; The Economist, 2001). In December 
1992, the Swiss voters rejected the country's bid to become part of the European Economic 
Area. Consequently, Swissair “had to watch as European carriers added flights to their 
schedules and entered alliances while its own attempts to grow were stymied by EU 
countries' reluctance to renegotiate individual aviation treaties with Switzerland” (Buerkle 
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and Anderson, 2002, p. 24). This was in sharp contrast to most of its rivals who had the 
benefits of being situated within the European Union to obtain attractive slots and access to 
routes to expand their operations with little effort. Indeed, the European Union law denied 
Swissair majority control of the Belgian airline.  
Prior to the “Hunter strategy”, the firm sought to establish the so-called “Alcazar alliance” to 
enable it to sidestep the constraints on its ability to expand. At the core of the strategy was the 
creation of the “fourth force” in pan-European aviation alongside the big three rivals, i.e. Air 
France, BA and Lufthansa. However, after a period of negotiation, the main parties were 
unable to agree on a range of issues including the choice of a U.S. partner given that 
Swissair’s alliance partner was Delta Air Lines, and KLM had a 25% controlling stake in 
Northwest Airlines (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002). “Swiss and Dutch national pride also put a 
damper on the entire effort, as it would have required surrendering flag carriers to a 
multinational” (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002, p. 24). The inability to resolve their differences 
led to the failure of the proposed alliance which prompted Swissair to acquire rival airlines as 
an alternative means of gaining a foothold across Europe.  
Environmental jolts  
Another factor that led to the firm’s demise was environmental jolts, defined as “transient 
perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations 
are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982, p. 515). In this context, the September 
11 attack had devastating effects on the operations of the airline. The events of 9/11 further 
altered the final position of putting it on a permanent path to decline. The airline, like others 
in the industry, was caught up in a thorny matrix of the effects of the “market's post-9/11 
weakness, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), the Iraq war, high fuel prices and, of 
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course, the global economic downturn and persistent recession” (Sparaco, 2010, p. 70). These 
changes in the environment led to a sharp decline in passenger traffic. These factors 
interacted to precipitate the decline and collapse of Swissair which has been referred to as the 
“Swissair Syndrome” (Sparaco, 2010). By and large, the hidden problems of the airline came 
to the fore after the September 11 attack.  
Also at the root of the firm’s problems was its European expansion strategy which led to 
deployment of resources to acquire stakes in other airlines as well as diversify into new areas. 
However, by 1999, the firm was affected by the overexpansion even before the September 11 
events. Under such harsh environmental conditions and sudden changes, cushions of slack 
resources appear to be a panacea in insulating such firms from the external shocks as well as 
providing space for an effective response strategy to be crafted (Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 
1990). However, at this stage, the firm’s financial resources had been depleted to the core, 
prompting them to rely on outsider organisations such as banks for continuation of services. 
The jolt revealed weak foundations in the firm’s operations which were not highly visible 
during the tranquil period before the crisis. In the wake of this event, multiple airlines 
survived largely due to a well-developed strategy to mitigate risks and a robust business 
model that targets mass customers. 
Dissolution stage 
In early 2001, Philippe Bruggisser was fired in an attempt to repair the damage to the firm’s 
reputation and balance sheet; this was “too little and too late” in bringing the costs under 
control (Kay, 2007). Although the arrival of Mario Corti as Chairman/CEO in 2001, just a 
mere six months before its collapse, ushered in a new atmosphere, the problems of the airline 
were deeply rooted and tied to past decisions made by the old management team stemming 
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from the aggressive expansion (The Economist, 2001). A new strategy was unveiled in an 
attempt to turn the fortunes of the airline. At the core of the new strategy was a shift from the 
strategy of rapid expansion towards retrenchment by offloading of underperforming assets. 
The new head started to offload the loss-making subsidiaries including Atraxis, improving in-
flight services and introducing a new business class (Floitau, 2001).  
The main constraint to this strategy was that it could not reduce “costs fast enough to keep 
pace with falling profits per passenger” nor extricate its stakes in the other failing airlines 
such as Air Littoral, AOM and Air Liberté fast enough to improve its survival chances (The 
Economist, 2001, p. 55). In the case of the three airlines above, the firm was spending around 
SFr1 billion to support the operations (The Economist, 2001). Billions of euros were invested 
into airlines which subsequently were declared bankrupt. However, the inherited problems 
were far too severe to be resolved in the short term. The arrival was insufficient to alter the 
fortunes of the airline. The case suggests that during tranquil periods, the firm over-
diversified its portfolio of activities rather than amassing slack resources to prepare it for 
sudden changes in the business environment.  
Case 2: Sabena 
The failure of Swissair precipitated the demise of Societé Anonyme Belge d'Exploitation de 
la Navigation Aérienne (known as Sabena), as the company owned a 49% share and 
depended on it for finance. Although both were traditional airlines with decades of 
experience, inability to adapt to changing circumstances ultimately contributed to their 
demise. The inability to find a suitable partner to inject capital into Sabena’s operations 
sealed its fate bringing to an end another sad chapter in the European aviation industry. The 
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underlying problem was its cost structure which contributed to heavy losses and debts of 
around €2 billion ($1.8 billion) (James, 2001).  
In 1995, SwissAir paid Sf267 million for a 49.5% stake in Sabena, however, its plan for the 
business was derailed when Sabena's unions staged strikes over the proposed cost reductions, 
thereby forcing the chief executive Pierre Godfroid to resign in 1996 (Buerkle and Anderson, 
2002; Doganis, 2006). Although Godfroid was subsequently replaced by Paul Reutlinger, 
Swissair's cost-cutting strategy was disrupted. This was very important given that Swissair 
Group had the controlling stake.  
Although Swissair could not exercise full control and management of Sabena as well as 
integrate the two airlines' fleets and route networks to gain synergetic benefits, it was still 
liable for Sabena's losses (Bonsu, 2001). Consequently, the demise of Swissair played an 
influential role in bringing about the demise of Sabena. On the verge of bankruptcy, the firm 
was diagnosed as having $10.5 billion in debts and draining financial resources (Olson, 
2001). Sabena’s failure can be partly attributed to its long-term commitments and inability to 
act following the decision by Swissair Group to withhold a promised cash contribution of 
$116 million in October 2001 (Meller, 2001). Following Swissair Group’s decision to stop 
injecting money into the loss-making airline, the airline was on a permanent path of decline 
(Nwabueze and Mileski, 2008).  
Although the terrorist attacks of September 11 and accompanying decline in air travel 
compounded the problems, Sabena had low exposure across the Atlantic (James, 2001). 
Indeed, around 80% of its flights were within Europe (James, 2001). Although a number of 
European and America airlines collapsed following the crisis, the fundamental business 
model of Sabena was far too weak to withstand the competitive pressures and the sharp 
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decline in consumers’ demand. The threat of competition from low-cost airlines such as 
Ryanair and Easyjet made it difficult for the firm to remain competitive. The high cost-base 
of the airline meant that a large segment of the market was carved out by the low-cost 
airlines. Indeed, the event merely disclosed historically hidden problems, risks and flaws in 
the firm’s routines, processes and strategy, route network and scope of operations. In a 
nutshell, poor management, strong unions, September 11 attack and misallocation of 
resources meant that the loss-making operations were no longer sustainable.  
Case 3: Cameroon Airlines, 1971–2008 
Another company whose downfall provides us with some useful lessons is the case of 
Cameroon Airlines. The state-owned airline was founded in 1971 and ceased operations in 
2008. The firm was founded following the decision by Cameroon to withdraw its financial 
and political support from Air Afrique in January 1971 (Flight International, 1985). Air 
Afrique was an airline formed in post-colonial Africa by former French colonies in west and 
central Africa, so the decision by the country to depart from the alliance was a blow to its 
members (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010, 2014). In addition, it also weakened the 
route network of Air Afrique.  
Immediately after its formation, Cameroon Airlines started passenger routes to regional cities 
such as Yaounde, Bangui, Cotonou, Abidjan, Brazzaville and Lagos from its Douala base. In 
the years that followed, the airline expanded to key European cities such as Geneva, Rome, 
Paris and London (Flight International, 1985). With the financial backing of the government, 
the airline was also able to develop an extensive domestic network. However, at the root of 
its success was the government support and subsidies. In 2008, three of its aircraft were 
grounded owing to non-payment of fuel bills and debts (Moores, 2008).  
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For decades, the airline’s ability to compete for customers was affected by a number of 
problems including poor safety record, inability to meet and conform to international 
standards, and poor customer experience (Moores, 2008; New York Times, 2005). Indeed, in 
September 2005 the French Civil Aviation Authority banned all flights by Cameroon Airlines 
for an indefinite period over safety concerns (New York Times, 2005). During the tranquil 
periods, limited attention and resources were devoted to improving and meeting safety 
standards and thereby culminating in this decision. Such was the devastating effect, it 
automatically disrupted the operations of the airline on one of its most profitable routes, the 
Douala/Yaoundé–Paris network.  
In addition, falling passenger traffic, poor decision making and rising oil prices exacerbated 
the precarious position of the airline, leading to its exit. In this case, the high oil prices merely 
unveiled the flaws in the firm’s strategy such as high staffing levels, over-reliance on a few 
routes and intense competition from French airlines for its key market. The inability to 
“weather the storm” such as high oil prices and September 11 crisis meant that it was in far 
too weak a position to survive given the tight financial constraints on the government (see 
New York Times, 2005).  
Furthermore, the airline was affected by declining passenger numbers which led to a number 
of flights being cancelled to cities including Paris. These events tarnished the reputation of 
the airline among its loyal customers. Even towards the end of the twentieth century, 
deregulation and liberalisation in the late 1980s had started altering the competitive 
landscape, paving the way for expansion of other regional rivals. The accelerated pace of 
liberalisation in the industry and accompanied competition from rival airlines had further-
reaching consequences than had been anticipated by the firm. The industry entered some kind 
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of the “Darwinian” phase of the survival of the fittest as more and more airlines disappeared 
due to the intense competition.  
Another contributory factor was the decision by the government to end funding the loss-
making operations of the airline. The cutback of public expenditure weakened the financial 
position of the firm and forced it to seek new sources of revenue. The story of Cameroon 
Airlines is that of a firm which failed to adapt and respond quickly to the changing times. In 
the face of a fast-changing competitive landscape, the firm was unable to reduce its 
dependency on the government for funding in a timely fashion to overcome the loss-making 
operations. The cases of Swissair and Cameroon Airlines suggest that inability to detect early 
warning signals means that the firms were left unprepared when the environment changed. 
The cases suggest that from time to time, sudden changes in the business environment render 
existing strategies ineffective in response to the shift. The cases highlight how competitive 
pressures can lead to business closure. Table 1 summarises the causes of failure and the 
opportunities for learning from the events.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Discussion and implications  
Our primary purpose in this paper was to examine why companies fail and how failure 
lessons can inform strategic foresight of other firms. We uncovered firm-specific factors such 
as top executives’ hubris, resistance to change and over-reliance on external consultants as 
precursors to organisational closure. Top executives’ hubris can spur firms to venture into 
high-risk areas, as occurred in the case of Swissair. This broad category of factors is rooted in 
the managerial and leadership issues of the focal firm. At the external level, we uncovered 
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factors such as new sources of competition and environmental jolts as some of the indicators 
of an impending closure of a business. Taken together, the findings suggest that 
understanding forces that precipitate organisational closure can equip surviving firms with 
the knowledge to improve their chances of success. Although some scholars have examined 
business closure (Hager et al., 1996), to date it remains unclear how it can inform outside 
firms’ strategic foresight. By demonstrating why the companies fail, the study thus enriches 
our understanding of how factors “arising from within” and external factors interact to 
precipitate business closure. Our research builds on prior research on antecedents to business 
closure. 
These contributions aside, our study has some important implications for practising 
managers. First, our findings suggest that, left unattended in a timely manner, early warning 
signals of decline can take on new forms and exacerbate the business conditions and thereby 
reduce the survival chances of firms. It is worth noting that the “environmental jolts rarely 
threaten the survival of soundly designed organisations with well-maintained environmental 
alignments” (Meyer, 1982, p. 515). Organisations need to improve their peripheral vision to 
help identify and respond to sudden changes in the external environment.  
Furthermore, our findings indicate that companies should think twice before allocating 
resources and expertise to losing courses of action. Early rather than late termination might 
be beneficial when the firm has entered the “downward spiral” (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1992). The cost savings might stem from eliminating misallocation of resources and 
expertise. Organisations can formally appoint individuals dedicated to learning from other 
businesses’ failures. Such clear definition of roles could equip the organisation to better 
understand looming threats and changes in their environment. The ability to assemble such 
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useful lessons and incorporate them into the organisational processes provides a foundation 
towards learning from others. Creating a long-term plan to learn from others would equip 
firms to improve their life chances.  
Our findings suggest that follow-up research could proceed in two main areas. First, it might 
be useful for future research to examine the mechanisms through which businesses fail. Such 
analysis would also help to provide a fine-grained analysis of the sources of learning from 
business failure. Future studies can include more cases than have been used here. We would 
encourage more work in this area geared towards creating processes, structures and routines 
that foster learning from failure.  
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Figure 1: The relationship between the causes of business closure and strategic foresight  
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Table 1:  Key events in the evolution of the two companies 
Years,  Key events Causes of demise Sources of learning for 
other companies 
Swisssair 
1931–2002 
 The airline was founded in 
1931. 
 In 1997, Philippe Bruggisser 
adopted the so-called “Hunter 
project”. 
 In January 2001, Mr 
Bruggisser was fired in an 
attempt to repair the damage 
to the firm.  
 In October 2001, the airline 
announced 2,650 job cuts. 
 In 2001, the airline 
abandoned its policy of 
acquiring stakes in foreign 
airlines. 
 It ceased operations in 2002. 
Internal factors  
Top executives’ hubris 
contributed to the collapse 
of the airline.  
Overconfidence leading to 
higher acquisition premium 
payments, coupled with the 
constraints on integration, 
contributed to the demise. 
Over-diversification via 
acquisition of stakes in 
multiple European airlines. 
External factors  
Environmental jolts – 
sudden changes in the 
business environment. 
Intense competition from 
low-cost airlines and legacy 
carriers. 
The September 11 attack. 
and its effects on the 
industry. 
Forging strategic 
alliances that enhance 
rather than devalue firm 
value. 
Mitigating risks inherent 
in expansion. 
Skills of decision makers 
play an influential role in 
mitigating risk and 
achieving organisational 
longevity.  
Creating conditions to 
foster risk awareness and 
learning from others’ 
experiences. 
 
Cameroon 
Airlines, 
1971–2008 
 Cameroon Airlines founded 
in 1971and exited in 2008. 
Internal factors  
Poor customer service. 
Poor safety record. 
External factors  
Sudden changes in the 
business environment. 
Intense competition from 
legacy carriers. 
The September 11 attack 
and its effects on the 
industry. 
Creating conditions to 
learn from others’ 
experiences. 
Data sources: synthesised by the authors. 
 
